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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE CONVENIENCE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
CONCEPT
By J. A.

MCCLAIN, JR.*

T is no longer novel to disagree with the Supreme Court in its

interpretation of the "public interest" concept. The origin and
historical development of the phrase, "business affected with a
public interest," have recently had a very full and interesting treatment. 1 That the phrase found publication and notoriety largely
by chance and the undaunted efforts of Lord Hale's ardent admirer, Mr. Francis Hargrave, is undoubtedly true.2 And it seems
equally certain that its author never intended the phrase to have
any application whatsoever to statutory regulation, but used it to
explain the duties imposed in the absence of statute by the common law on the owners and operators of certain limited conveniences to charge only reasonable prices for their services.3 Despite
*Dean of the Mercer University School of Law, Macon, Ga.
'McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected With A Public Interest, (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 759. Hamilton, Affectation with Public
Interest, (1930) 34 Yale L. J. 1089.
2McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected With A Public Interest, (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 759. See Hargrave, Law Tracts, Preface 2, 3.
3
This appears evident when the many statutes are considered which
See
regulated prices and wages before Lord Hale wrote (1596-1603).
Cassidy, The Emergence of the Free Labor Contract in England, (1929)
18 Am. Ec. Rev. 201; 2 Cunningham, Growth of English History and Commerce, 22; Gilmore, Governmental Regulation of Prices, (1905) 17 Green
Bag 627; Cheadle, Governmental Control of Business, (1920) 20 Col. L.
Rev. 550.

For list of the statutes having particular reference to wages

and laborers see Sayre, Cases on Labor Law 3 et seq.
The English courts applying Lord Hale's principle clearly show that
irrespective of statute an owner or operator of a convenience "affected with
a public interest" could charge only reasonable prices. See Allnut v.
Inglis, (1810) 12 East 527, where a duty to charge only reasonable prices
was imposed on certain warehousei in the absence of Parliamentary limitation.
When the matter has come before the American State courts, the existence of a "public interest" has been declared a legislative and not a judicial
question. Unless the legislature has spoken, no "public interest" will be
found. This is true regardless of whether a monopoly exists. Ladd v.
Southern Cotton Press Mfg. Co., (1880) 53 Tex. 172. Nor does the
magnitude of the business conducted affect the question until legislative
declaration. American Live Stock Comm. Co. v. Chicago Live Stock
Exchange, (1890) 143 Ill. 210, 32 N. E. 274. See also, Delaware L & W.
R. R. Co. v. Central Stockyard & T. Co., (1889) 45 N. J. Eq. 50, 17 At. 146.
These decisions would seem to be unsound since the question of a
"public interest" was always a judicial one in its English development. It
may be said, however, that even though the legislature has declared a
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the recent expositions on the subject by Mr. Justice Sutherland
and others,' it still remains a puzzle to many that the Supreme
Court should have gone to the common law of England, where
Parliament sits with plenary constitutional power, to select the
criteria by which the constitutionality of American price and wage
regulation should be determined; and that in so doing the statutory declarations of England which would have justified the most
far-reaching results in price and wage fixing were utterly ignored.5
However strange this may be, a still more curious phenomenon is
the surprising agility with which the court may-at its pleasureseize upon the concept to affirm or deny regulation on the one
hand, or, on the other, leave it to repose unnoticed on the shelf
of judicial tools.
Mr. Justice Sutherland has stated for the majority of the
court that there is a great deal of difference between regulation
as to price and regulation with respect to other features of a
business, and that in order for price restrictions to be valid the
business in question must be "affected with a public interest."6'
If this be true, there must be some extraordinary severity pertaining to regulations affecting prices as distinguished from those
affecting wages and those resulting in taking the subject matter of property. This seems to be a most peculiar result, however,
for has not the court said that an industrial commission cannot be
authorized to fix the wages in a business even though it be "affected with a public interest ?"7 And one would ordinarily think
that an actual taking of the thing itself is of equal if not greater
severity than a mere regulation with regard to price."
"public interest" to exist, a court may decide otherwise.

See cases infra

note 4.
4Mr. Justice Sutherland has been the spokesman for the majority in
the last three cases in which the existence of a "public interest" was denied.
Tyson v. Banton, (1927) 273 U. S.418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed. 718;
Ribnik v. McBride, (1928) 277 U. S.350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. Ed. 913;

Williams v. Standard Oil Co., (1929)
73 L. Ed. 287.
GSupra note 3.

278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115,

GTyson v. Banton, (1927) 273 U. S.418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed.
718; Ribnik v. McBride, (1928) 277 U. S.350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. Ed.
913. Is this same view of the police power held by Mr. Justice Sutherland
in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., (1929) 272 U. S.365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114,
71 L. Ed. 303?
7Wolff v. Court of Industrial Relations, (1923)
262,U. S.522, 43 Sup.

Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103. The Court did not in fact find a "public interest"
to exist, but it did say that the regulations passed would not be valid even

though the business were so affected.

8Noble State Bank v. Haskell, (1911) 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186,
55 L. Ed. 112, rehearing (1911) 219 U. S.575, 31 Sup. Ct. 299, 55 L. Ed. 341.
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There appear to be many instances, however, in which the court
has sanctioned legislation which either affected wages or actually
appropriated the thing'itself; and in none of these cases has it
been felt necessary to invoke the "public interest" doctrine.
The decisions in which the Supreme Court has upheld restrictions relating to the hours of labor present an interesting study
in this connection.9

For example, in Bunting v. Oregon'0 legis-

lation of the state of Oregon was upheld, which provided for a
ten-hour day for employees of any mill, factory or manufacturing establishment and which contained a provision that employees
might work three hours overtime if paid at the rate of time and
one-half of the regular wage. It was urged by those attacking
the legislation that the law really provided for wage regulation by
reason of the clause as to overtime work, but the court held that
this stipulation was in the nature of a mild penalty to enforce the
ten-hour day. It can hardly be doubted, however, that irrespective
of the overtime clause, this legislation directly or indirectly affected the amount of wages paid. Certainly if the employer has
to pay the same amount for fewer hours of work the rate of
wages has been affected. It is generally the view of the court,
however, in upholding legislation restricting hours of labor, that
the employer and employee are still left free to contract as to
Here the entire Court upheld a statute which required each state bank to
contribute to a sinking fund so that depositors of insolvent banks might
be paid.
The Court speaking through Mr. justice Sutherland has upheld zoning
regulations that result in the owner of land being deprived of using a part
thereof for building purposes. Apparently no difficulty was encountered in
bringing these restrictions under the general police power, although there
are state decisions holding them unconstitutional. See Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., (1929) 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303, and
Gorieb v. Fox, (1926) 274 U. S. 603, 47 Sup. Ct. 675,1 71 L. Ed. 1228
where9 the opposing view with respect to their constitutionality is reviewed.
. See Holden v. Hardy, (1898) 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed.
780, (statute upheld limiting miners to an eight hour day). Cf. Lochner v.
New York, (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (statute
providing for ten hour day in bakeries held unconstitutional). See Muller
v. Oregon, (1908) 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. 551 (legislation
upheld limiting hours of labor of women employed in laundries); Bunting
v. Oregon, (1917) 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435, 61 L. Ed. 830. (ten hour
day upheld for all people engaged as employees in mills, factories and other
manufacturing establishments) ; Stettler v. O'Hara, (1914) 69 Or. 519, 139
Pac. 743, aff'd (1917) 243 U. S. 648, 37 Sup. Ct. 475, 61 L. Ed. 937, (in
a memorandum opinion the Supreme Court by an equally divided court
(four and four) up'held minimum wage laws for women and minors). But
see Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67
L. Ed. 785. See also, O'Hara v. Luckenback S. S. Co., "(1926) 269 U. S.
364, 46 Sup. Ct. 157, 70 L. Ed. 313.
10(1917) 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435, 61 L. Ed. 830.
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wages and that the hour restriction merely furnishes a new plane
of competition." From a practical standpoint, however, such a
result does not follow, for, implied in every hour regulation is
the understanding that the wages are to remain the same, that
the employee will be paid as much for the new day as he was for
So it would seem that in some degree at least a reguthe old.'
lation as to hours has something to do with the rate of compensation, and yet the court has not deemed it necessary to find that
each business in which the hours of labor are sought to be restricted must be "affected with a public interest" before such
regulation is valid. The court seems content in these cases to
rest the validity of the legislation on the general police power of
the state and feels no need of moral support from the "public
interest" test.
3
In Stettler v. O'Hara&
legislation of the state of Oregon providing for a commission with power to investigate working conditions of women and minors and to prescribe, if it thought fit,
standard working conditions, standard working hours and minimum wages, was upheld by an evenly divided court of eight. No
opinion was written by the Supreme Court and it is quite doubtful to just what extent the court committed itself by this decision.
It is interesting to note, however, that in the decisions of the
Oregon court no reference was made to the "public interest" concept, the validity of the legislation being based on its tendency to
protect the health and safety of the people and to promote their
general welfare. Perhaps the effect of this memorandum decision
"lIn Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 553, 554,
43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785, 795, Mr. Justice Sutherland said:
"The essential characteristic of the statute now under consideration,
which differentiates it from the laws fixing hours of labor, will be made
to appear as we proceed. It is sufficient now to point out that the latter,
as well as the statutes mentioned under paragraph (3) deal with incidentals
of the employment having no necessary effect upon the heart of the contract; that is,. the amount of wages to be paid and received. A law forbidding work to continue beyond a given number of hours leaves the parties
free to contract about wages and thereby equalizes whatever additional
burdens may be imposed upon the employer as a result of the restrictions
as to hours, by an adjustment in respect of the amount of wages."
1S"As an essential part of the state regulation of wages and prices was
the regulation of the hours of labor. Whatever affects the hours of labor
also affects the wages, and whatever affects wages necessarily involves
prices, so that it is impracticable to legislate on one subject without becoming
concerned with the other. The modern legislation attempting to fix the
hours of labor will logically lead to similar attempts at fixing prices and
wages," Gilmore, Governmental Regulations of Prices, (1905) 17 Green
Bag 627, 630.
13(1914) 69 Or. 519, 139 Pac. 743, aff'd (1917) 243 U. S. 648, 37
Sup. Ct. 475, 61 L. Ed. 937.
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was negatived by the later decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,14 in which case similar legislation passed for the District
of Columbia was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
There is also a group of miscellaneous cases in which various
types of regulations have been upheld under the general police
power of the state or. under the similar power of Congress, and
although it appears that some of these regulations affected wages
in connection with the business in question, no reference was
5
made to the "public interest" doctrine. In McLean v. Arkansas
a statute was declared constitutional which made it unlawful for
any operator of a coal mine employing ten or more men to screen
the coal before weighing it and to base their compensation on its
weight thus screened. All contracts or agreements in conflict
with this statute were declared void. The evident purpose of
this regulation was to insure the payment of underground miners
on the basis of the quantity and weight of coal in its condition as
it was passed to the surface of the mine. When this was done,
clearly the miners were paid more than they would have been had
the compensation been measured by the weight of the coal when
screened. Certainly, then, this regulation affected the amount of
wages paid the miners, for they would receive more money for
their labor under the provisions of this statute than they would
if the practice prevailed of screening the coal before weighing
it. Yet no mention was made of the coal mining industry being
"affected with a public interest," and the legislation was sustained
under the general police power of the state.
6
In Knoxville Iron Company v. Harbison a Tennessee statute

was declared valid which required the redemption in cash at face
1.4(1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785. The statute
provided for a board to investigate the wages paid women and minors in
different occupations in which they were employed in the District of
Columbia, and, if, after conferences and a hearing from both employer
and employee, the board deemed the wages paid by any business to be inadequate for the necessary cost of living, it could set a minimum wage.
This legislation was declared unconstitutional by the majority who spoke
through Mr. Justice Sutherland. It is to be noted that the statute was
very loosely drawn and was very vague. It did not, as the legislation in the
Stettler v. O'Hara case, refer to any specific industries, nor did it embrace
any other conditions such as standard working hours or other conditions of
work. It specifically referred to wages alone and based their amount on the
"necessary cost of living." These facts seem to have influenced the Court's
decision. Mr. Justice Sutherland said:
"The standard furnished by the statute for the guidance of the board is
so vague as to be impossible of practical application with any reasonable
degree of accuracy."
15(1909) 211 U. S.539, 29 Sup. Ct. 206, 63 L. Ed. 315.
10(1901) 183 U. S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. 1, 46 L. Ed. 55.
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value of store orders or other evidences of debt issued in payment of wages. The Iron Company had a certain pay day once
a month and on this day its employees were paid in cash, but if
they desired wages at other times the company would give them
orders for coal at its store, which orders could be used or transferred by the employees. If the employees elected to use such
orders for coal they would get the coal at the market price and
the orders would be received in payment. If the orders were negotiated by the employees they would receive about eighty-five
cents on the dollar in cash. The employees, however, did not
have to take these store orders unless they so desired, for their
wages would be paid in cash on the regular pay day. The orders
were merely a means whereby an employee could obtain an advance payment of his wages. Although it would seem that the
regulations included in this legislation would alter the amount of
wages each employee received, yet the court felt no need to invoke Lord Hale's aphorism, and the legislation was upheld under
the police power of the state. 7
A very interesting case is presented in Frisbie v'. United
States.1 An act of Congress was declared constitutional which
provided that no "agent, attorney or other person" should receive a fee of more than ten dollars ($10.00) for his services in
securing a pension. The defendant, an attorney, who was indicted
under the penal provisions of the act for taking a larger fee than
allowed, pleaded that the act "interfered with the price of labor
and the freedom of contract." The court held this objection untenable and said that since the government awarded pensions as
a matter of bounty, it could also control all the conditions under
which they were received. The court said:
'7Similar legislation in Virginia which required all employees of any
manufacturing company to be paid in cash was declared to be constitutional
in Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, (1914) 234 U. S. 224, 34 Sup. Ct.
856, 58 L. Ed. 1288. There was no reference to a "public interest."
See also Patterson v. Eudora, (1902)" 190 U. S. 169, 23 Sup. Ct. 821,
47 L. Ed. 1022, where Congress was sustained in an act which forbade any
advance payment of wages to seamen, and which punished any infraction of
the act by a fine, and further provided that such advance payment should
not absolve the vessel, master or owner from full payment of wages earned
exclusive of such advance payment. The act was held to apply to foreign
ships in American ports.
And see Schmidinger v. City of Chicago, (1913) 226 U. S. 578, 33
Sup. Ct. 182, 57 L. Ed. 364 where an ordinance was upheld which fixed a
standard size and weight for loaves of bread and punished any infraction
thereof by fine.
18(1895) 157 U. S. 160, 15 Sup. Ct. 586, 39 L. Ed. 657.
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"No man has a legal right to a pension, and no man has a
legal right to interfere in the matter of obtaining pensions for
himself or others."' 19
Regardless of whether the court could have more logically based
its decision on the "police power" of Congress, as was done in
the later case, 20 the interesting point in this discussion is that
no need was felt to apologize for legislation which directly
limited the fee which a lawyer could charge for his services in
securing a pension, a significant fact in light of the usual reluctance of the court to allow a state to fix wages regardless of the'
legislature's conviction as to the necessity for such regulation.
Another very interesting example of the court's forgetfulness
of the "public interest" concept occurred in Noble State Bank z.
Haskell.2' There a statute was upheld which required every bank
to contribute a certain amount of money, which was determined
by taking one per cent of its average daily deposits with certain
deductions, to a guaranty fund for insolvent banks. Oklahoma
passed this statute to insure full payment of depositors in banks
that failed. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for a full court, declared that this statute was a valid exercise of the police power
of the state and did not infringe any constitutional rights. He
frankly admitted that the effect of the requirement was to take
the property of one to help pay the debts of a failing rival, but
stated that more powerful considerations contributing to the
safety and welfare of the public demanded that the legislation be
sustained. Without questioning the wisdom or validity of this
157 U. S. 160, 166, 15 Sup. Ct. 586, 39 L. Ed. 657.
19(1895)
20
1n Calhoun v. Massee, (1920) 253 U. S. 170, 40 Sup. Ct. 474, 64
L. Ed. 843 the Court by a five to four decision sustained an act of Congress, the effect of which prevented the appellant from receiving fees for
which he had contracted seventeen years before the appropriation was made
and the fee limit fixed for certain Civil War claims. Mr. Justice Brandeis
said for the Court:
"An appropriate exercise by a state of its police power is consistent
with the 14th Amendment, although it results in serious depreciation of
property values; and the United States may, consistently with the fifth
amendment, impose, for a permitted purpose, restrictions upon property
which produce like results."
21(1911) 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55 L. Ed. 112, rehearing
(1911) 219 U. S. 575, 31 Sup. Ct. 299, 55 L. Ed. 341. See Lankford v.
Platte Iron Works, (1914) 235 U. S. 461, 470, 35 Sup. Ct. 173, 59 L. Ed.
316. In Abilene Nat. Bk. v. Dolley, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1910) 102 C. C. A. 607,
179 Fed. 461 the circuit court of appeals had already held that it was constitutional for a legislature to give state banks authority to contribute
to a guaranty fund, and that national banks were not discriminated against
by such legislation.
See also Farmers' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, (1922)
262 U. S. 649, 43 Sup. Ct. 651, 67 L. Ed. 1157.
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legislation, it would seem that the exercise of the police power
in this situation is equally as severe, to say the least, as so-called
price fixing legislation, for here the property of one is not merely
limited as to the charge for its use but the property itself is actually taken, and yet no mention was made of banks being "affected with a public interest." That legislation of this type is
upheld while the constitutionality of price regulation is denied
leads one to wonder if it is viewed in a more favorable constitutional light when the property itself is taken than when the rate
charged for the use of the subject-matter of property is reg22

ulated.

Although the regulations just reviewed vary in kind, yet each
regulation in one respect or another touches wages or actually
appropriates property. Is the answer for their constitutionality
on the one hand, while price regulations are condemned on the
other, that the legislature may in the exercise of its police power
do indirectly that which it cannot do directly? Or is the difference in attitude towards the two types of regulations determined
by a more marked interference with the competitive system, in
the court's opinion, by direct price regulation than it feels to be
present in the other type of regulation? If the latter be the case,
then the competitive system has been apotheosized to the highest
possible degree, and constitutional rights are determined by a
theory of economics that one cannot find expressed in the federal
constitution. It is difficult to see why the very "heart of a contract," to use Mr. Justice Sutherland's words,2" is affected by a
regulation pertaining to wages and prices when it is admitted
that all the other features of a contract of employment may be
regulated as the legislature deems best. 'Especially does this difficulty exist when some of the admittedly valid regulative provisions
result in a difference in the wages paid. And as to the ones which
do not go to this length, but only affect the mode or time of jayment, it seems sound to say, as expressed by Mr. Chief Justice
Taft in his dissenting opinion in the Adkins Case, that:
22This view is suggested by a note in (1921) 70 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
48-51. The editor says there is no limit to the police power when the
thing itself is taken, so long as its taking is justified by a public need.
Quaere: Can the "need" for insuring payment of depositors in failing
banks properly be called a "public need"? See Comment, (1927) 36 Yale
L. J.985 for exposure of Court's inconsistency in approving the expenditure
of public money for recreational purposes on the one hand, while denying the
power3 of the state to regulate commissions of ticket brokers on the other.
2 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 554, 43 Sup. Ct.

394, 67 L.Ed. 785.
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"In absolute freedom of contract the one term [of a contract]
is as important as the other, for both enter equally into the consideration given and received; a restricti6n as to one is not any
greater in essence than the other, and is of the24same kind. One
is the multiplier and the other the multiplicand.

With respect to the cases that have dealt directly with the "public interest" concept there may be said to be two distinctive periods
of development. For convenience they may be called "the affirmative and the negative periods." In the "affirmative period,"
which may be said to date from Munn v. Illinois" to the rent
cases,2 the Supreme Court uniformly found a "public interest"
The
to exist in every important case involving price regulation.
march of price regulation certainly seemed to be onward, although
voices of vigorous dissent were consistently heard. Beginning
with the case of Wolff Packing Co. v.Court of Industrial Relations and extending up to date, however, a negative reaction seems
to have set in, and the validity of price regulation has been denied
Again strong dissents from the
in every case of importance.2
opposing justices are registered. 29 From such radical disagree24
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 564, 43 Sup.
Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785.
25(1876) 94 U. S.113, 24 L. Ed. 77.
26Block v. Hirsh, (1921) 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865;
Brown v. Feldman, (1921) 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65 L. Ed.
877; Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, (1922) 258 U. S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289, 66
L. Ed.
595.
27

The cases in this period are: Munn v. Illinois, (1876)) 94 U. S. 113,
24 L. Ed. 77; Budd v. New York, (1891) 143 U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468,
36 L. Ed. 247; Brass v. Stoeser, (1894) 153 U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857,
38 L. Ed. 757; Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards, (1901) 183 U. S. 79,
22 Sup. Ct. 30, 46 L. Ed. 92; German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis,
(1914) 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612, 58 L. Ed. 1011; Block v. Hirsh,
(1921) 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865; Brown v. Feldman,
(1921) 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65 L. Ed. 877; Levy Leasing Co. v.
'Siegel, (1922) 258 U. S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289, 66 L. Ed. 595.
28
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct.
394, "67 L. Ed. 785; Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
(1923) 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103; Tyson v. Banton,
(1927) 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L.- Ed. 718; Ribnik v. McBride,
(1928) 277 U. S. 350. 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. Ed. 913; Williams v. Standard
Oil Co., (1929) 278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115, 73 L. Ed. 287.
29
The more liberal view of the dissenting justices is well represented
by Mr.-Justice Stone's opinions in Tyson v. Banton, (1927) 273 U. S. 418,
47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed. 718, and Ribnik v. McBride, (1928) 277 U. S.
350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. Ed. 913. In both of these cases he argues against
confining. the limits of control by barren historicity and contends for a
more scientific study of existing social and economic conditions as a basis
for regulation. It is very interesting to compare the similarity between the
attitude of the dissenting justices in the earlier cases (supra note 25) who
inveighed against regulation and that of the majority who have denied regulation in the recent cases. Supra note 26.
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ment one could hardly expect to find positive outlines that would
unmistakably identify the form of a "public interest." The reactionary period has within it a doctrine which has received scant
attention from the court, although it can hardly be said that occasion has demanded a consideration of such doctrine and its consequences. It seems quite possible, however, that in the future
this doctrine may be more disturbing and less innocuous than it
now seems.
The development of the "public interest" doctrine in the decisions prior to Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Thdustrial Relations3" seemed definitely to establish the principle that all business

"affected with a public interest" may be subjected to price control. It was not until the Wolff Case that it could be doubted that
finding a "public interest" would not alone solve the problem of
regulation. It is true that all of these earlier decisions dealt with
regulations of the prices of commodities or services, and did not
directly involve wage regulations. There was an intimation in the
Adkins Case3 that the concept of a "public interest" might have
something to do with wage regulation, but the Stettler Case32 did
not involve the concept at all. The Supreme Court in affirming
the state court decision in the Stettler Case impliedly approved
the legislation on the broader ground that it was designed to protect the safety and health of the people and promote their general
welfare. 33 In the Wolff Case, however, Mr. Chief Justice Taft
30(1923) 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103.
32(1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785.

32(1914) 69 Or. 519, 139 Pac. 743, aff'd (1917) 243 U. S. 648, 37 Sup.
Ct. 475, 61 L. Ed. 937.
"3There are decisions of lower federal and state courts upholding the
price regulations on much broader grounds than the "public interest doctrine." The federal power to regulate the price of coal was upheld as a
war measure designed to prevent unreasonable and extortionate profits in
United States v. Pennsylvania Central Coal Company, (D.C. Pa. 1918) 256
Fed. 703. And while the Lever Act was held unconstitutional because of
the definite price standard, United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., (1921)
255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. 298, 65 L. Ed. 516, yet many lower federal court
decisions upheld the federal power to fix the price of various necessities
under this Act before it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court. United States v. Spokane Dry Goods Co., (D.C. Wash. 1920) 264
Fed. 209; C. A. Weed v. Lockwood, (D.C.N.Y. 1920) 264 Fed. 453; United
States v. Rosenblum, (D.C. Pa. 1920) 264 Fed. 578; United States v.
Oglesby Grocery Co., (D.C. Ga. 1920) 264 Fed. 691.
And in People v. Weller, (1924) 237 N. Y. 316, 143 N. E. 205, aff'd
in (1925) 268 U. S. 319, 45 Sup. Ct. 556, 69 L. Ed. 978 (with no consideration of the power to control prices) the validity of a statute forbidding, among other restrictions, ticket brokers to resell tickets to places
of public amusement at more than fifty cents in advance of their face price
was based more on the ground that the remedy adopted was the one most
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not only declared that the validity of wage regulation was not
determined by the existence of a "public interest," but also intimated that price or other regulation might be invalid even though
the business in question was "affected with a public interest."
He divided such businesses as follows:
"Businesses said to be clothed with a public interest justifying
some public regulation may be divided into three classes:
Those which are carried on under the authority of a
"(1)
public grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirmative duty of rendering a public service demanded
by any member of the public. Such are the railroads, other common carriers and public utilities.
"(2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the public
interest attaclhing to which, recognized from earliest times, has
survived the period of arbitrary laws by Parliament or colonial
legislatures for regulating all trades and callings. Such are those
of the keepers of inns, cabs, and gristmills...
Businesses which, though not public at their inception,
"(3)
may be fairly said to have risen to be such, and have become subject in consequence to some government regulation. They have
come to hold such a peculiar relation to the public that this is superimposed upon them. In the language of the cases, the owner, by
devoting his business to the public use, in effect grants the public
an interest in that use, and subjects himself to public regulation
to the extent of that interest, although the property continues to
belong to its private owner, and to be entitled to protection accordingly."
But-he stated:
"To say that a business is clothed with a public interest is not
to determine what regulation may be permissible in view of the
private rights of the owner. The extent to which an inn or a cab
system may be regulated may differ widely from that allowable as
to a railroad or other common carrier. It is not a matter of legislikely to prevent extortion, than on the more technical argument as to a
"public interest." The provision as to resale price was later declared
unconstitutional, however, by the federal Supreme Court in Tyson & Bro.
v. Banton, (1927) 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed. 718.
See Rottschaefer, Governmental Price Control, (1925) 35 Yale L.
J. 438, 447, where it is said:
"The reasoning of all these decisions, in the final analysis, is in substance that the legislatures have the power to promote the general welfare
by preventing through price control the undue capitalization by any group
of its economic powers. Their significance does not consist in their having
developed a more definite and easily applied test of liability to price control. They have been no more successful in that respect than the line of
cases formulating the determining factors in terms of business affected with
a public interest. Their chief importance lies in their broader approach to
the problem of price control. It is their special merit that they have, in the
very form of its statement, recognized the problem of price control as a
species of well-known and more inclusive genus."
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lative discretion solely. It depends on the nature of the business,
on the features which touch the public, and on the abuses reasonably to be feared. .

.

. The regulation of rates to avoid monopoly

is one thing. The regulation of wages is another."'
This doctrine of varying degrees of "publicness" is quite interesting for its novelty and the problems that it raises. There
are possibly some who are ready to affirm that it has already seen
service.35 Certainly Mr. Chief Justice Waite would be disappointed if he could see the concept that he created thus devitalized.
In one sense, however, Mr. Chief Justice Taft struck a note of
progress, for imperfectly expressed in his "degree doctrine" is the
idea that one set of economic factors may call for price regulation
and yet not demand wage regulation, and vice versa. It is obvious that economic disturbances may enable a business to charge
exorbitant prices although the wage conditions in that business are
perfectly satisfactory from a social and economic viewpoint. In
fact, there is no necessary relation between a monopoly and unreasonably low wages. No one would contend that the wages paid
by Munn should be regulated simply because grain elevator8 in
Chicago possessed a monopoly, or that the wages of insurance employees could be regulated merely because the "business of insurance is affected with a public interest." It seems quite necessary
for wisely planned legislation to draw a sharp distinction between
the economic factors calling for wage regulation and those demanding price regulation. A law establishing minimum wages may
have the effect of raising prices rather than lowering them, while
a maximum wage law may lower prices by reducing the cost of
production. Nor would it seem desirable to limit wage regulation
to public service companies as might be inferred from the stress
laid in Wilson v. New36 on the fact that railroads are engaged in
34(1923) 262 U. S. 522, 535, 539, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103.
With this statement of Mr. Chief Justice Taft compare the following by
Mr. Justice Holmes:
"But if the public interest be established the regulation of rates is one
of the first forms in which it is asserted, and the validity of such legislation has been settled since Munn v. Illinois." Block v. Hirsh, (1921) 256
U. S.35 145, 157, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 15 L. Ed. 865
In Frost v. Corporation Commissioners, (1929) 278 U. S. 515, 49
Sup. Ct 235, 73 L. Ed. 483, the Court, in its implied approval of the Oklahoma legislature's declaration that a cotton gin is a "public business,"
seems to recognize a distinct legal category from either a "business affected
with a public interest" or a "public utility." For discussion of this case
see, Hamilton, Judicial Tolerance of Farmers' Cooperatives, (1929) 38 Yale

L. J. 936.

36(1917) 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L. Ed. 755. It is difficult to
say just how much weight the Court gave to the fact in this case that rail-
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a public service. Therefore, in so far as Mr. Chief Justice Taft
recognized price regulation and wage regulation as distinctive
genera, his opinion is a forward step.
But the further implication that some businesses, even though
"affected with a public interest," may not be regulated with respect to price raises more doubtful and disturbing questions. Must
we follow Mr. Justice Sutherland in his laborious search for the
Holy Grail of the "public interest" concept, only to learn when we
have found it that we are but a few steps on the way toward our
ultimate goal, and that we must wander further in quest of some
still more elusive concept? Such a prospect, to say the least, is
disturbing. The problem would cease to be merely academic if we
should have can attempted regulation of the prices charged by a
business which is admittedly "affected with a public interest." Historically and by judicial pronouncement an example exists in the
public inn or hotel.
From a very early period in Anglo-American law inns have
been treated as public callings and unusual duties and regulations
have been imposed upon them.37 The Supreme Court has often
spoken of inns as "affected with a public interest" and therefore
subject to public regulation, 8 and Mr. Chief Justice Taft, in his
classification of such businesses in the Wolff Case, placed inns in
the second division along with cabs and gristmills. In his dissent
to the Insuraiwe Case, Mr. Justice Lamar assumed that inns were
subject to rate regulation, but stated that there was no American
case in which the constitutionality of such regulation bad been decided.3 9 Today there are many provisions by statute for the
supervision of inns and some features of these regulations approach dangerously close to what Mr. Justice Sutherland called
price fixing in the Ribnik Case.40 There is at least one recent state
roads had long been held to be "affected with a public interest" as justification for the unusual measures of the Adamson Act. See Powell, Due Process
and the Adamson Law, (1917) 17 Col. L. Rev. 114; Powell, The Supreme

Court37 and the Adamson Law, (1917) 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 607.

For discussion of this historical development, see Burdick, Origin
of Public Service Duties, (1911) 11 Col. L. Rev. 514. According to his
view, the businesses of the common carrier and the inn are the ones to which
the common
law consistently attached the duties of a common calling.
38
Munn v. Illinois, (1876) 94 U. S. 113, 120, 24 L. Ed. 77, 84; German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, (1914) 233 U. S. 389, 426, 34 Sup. Ct. 612, 58
L. Ed. 1011.
39
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, (1914) 233 U. S. 389, 426, 34 Sup.
Ct. 612, 58 L. Ed. 1011.
4OThe following statutes are not exhaustive but merely illustrative of
the regulations in effect in many states. Ohio provides for a hotel super-
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decision which may be said to approve the constitutionality of such
regulations. 4 The changes in the method of operating hotels,
which changes in many instances have resulted in large chain systems, may well, be calculated to demand greater governmental
supervision; and, in the not too remote future, it is quite probable
that the Supreme Court may be called upon to declare itself on
the constitutionality of hotel rate regulation. Such a case, if presented, would make a clear-cut issue of the "degree doctrine."
Mr. Justice Sutherland would not have to grope for the elements
constituting a "public interest," for they are concluded by history
and former decisions. Would the Court allow the historical considerations to conclude the matter in favor of such legislation, or
would an inquiry be made as to whether the amount of "publicness" adhering to hotels could be said to justify the regulation?
In summary, it would seem that the use of the phrase "business
affected with a public interest" in connection with price and wage
control represents a futile and isolated attempt to formulate in
definite terms a restriction upon the police power of a state. Certainly in considering other types of regulations the Court has not
attempted to delimit the field of police power. It has been content
in each case to determine whether the particular legislation in
question concerned the safety, health or general welfare of the
people and whether the means chosen to effect a betterment bore a
reasonable relation to the end in view. It does not seem reasonable
visory department in the office of the state fire marshal. Each hotel must
file a schedule of rates with the state fire marshal and no advance can be
made in these rates without written notice filed with the fire marshal
twenty days before hand. Ohio, Gen. Code, 1926, sec. 843-18. For similar
provisions see Kansas, Rev. Stat. 1923, ch. 36, art. 124-128. See also New
York Consol. Laws, Cahill 1923, ch. 21, secs. 200-209; Illinois, Rev. Stat.,
1927, ch. 71, secs. 1-20.
Smith-Hurd,
41
State v. Norval Hotel Co., (1921) 103 Ohio St. 361, 133 N. E. 75.
The Norval Hotel Co. was indicted for charging higher rentals than provided in the schedule filed with the state fire marshal. The Court stated
that the Act did not fix a price of any room, and upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The Court said:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that, at times, when large numbers of the public meet in cities or towns for conventions, or similar gatherings, the capacity of hotels and places for public accommodation is taxed
and opportunity is thereby given for the exaction of exorbitant or unfair
charges."
See note in (1922) 6 MINNESOTA LAw REviEw 327.
There were statutes in the early 1800's which fixed rates for hotels.
See South v. Grant, (1823) 7 N. J. L. 26; Banks v. Oden, (1819) 1 A. K.
Marsh (Ky.) 546. And see State v. McFarland, (1910) 60 Wash. 98, 110
Pac. 792, where statute was upheld which made hotels pay for an inspector's services.
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to maintain that a regulation as to prices or wages cuts deeper
from a constitutional viewpoint than a taking of the subject matter
of property, and yet in the latter type of case no technical approach
such as the use of the "public interest" concept has been found
necessary. The selection of a narrow and technical approach by
assuming that a business must be "affected with a public interest"
before its prices or wages are subject to supervision has resulted
in confusion, inconsistency and uncertainty. Besides, recent decisions of the Court appear to have destroyed whatever content
the concept had developed in the line of earlier cases.
In the first instance it was highly illogical to assume that the
common law furnished a criterion of what our legislatures can do
under the federal constitution, and it was equally illogical in making this assumption to ignore all the statutory legislation in England concerning price and wage regulation. The Court, having
taken this approach, uses the phrase to approve or deny regulation
no matter how widely the social and economic factors may-differ
in one case from another. In one case the existence of a "virtual
monopoly" may seem to be the test, while in another a general failure of the competitive system to produce desired results may be
the basis of the concept, and in yet another either or both of these
42
conditions may be declared insufficient to support regulation.
It seems impossible in the very nature of the case for any one
concept, regardless of its creator, to be so all-embracing as to
reconcile these dissimilar situations, or for it to have any scientific
value in solving the problem. Furthermore, the Court seens vaguely to realize the failure of the concept to settle satisfactorily the
varied problems presented by wage as distinguished from price
regulation. The phrase seems to act merely as a screen for concealing the real forces moving the Court to its decision, and provides an easy means for the Court to substitute its judgment for
that of the legislature.
Moreover, if the Court ever attaches any weight to the degree
doctrine of "'publicness," the concept of a "public interest" would
clearly be relegated to the background as utterly useless. For
even though it be assumed that the business is "affected with a
public interest," the main question would still lie ahead: What
kinds of regulation are applicable?
42
See McAllister, Lord Hale And Business Affected With a Public
Interest, (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 759, 768.

